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Abstract The New Zealand Government is in the process of considering a law that would 
require all commercial, multi unit and multi-storey residential buildings upgraded and 
strengthened to a minimum of 35% or more of the New Building Standard. Buildings so 
designated will have up to 15 years from the end of the review period to bring their 
buildings into line with these requirements.  The proposal particularly affects old 
buildings constructed in unreinforced brick masonry. Many of these are home shop 
buildings with some heritage value, built around the turn of the 20th Century. Together 
they make up a considerable portion of many small town commercial precincts. The 
proposed legislation will affect all parts of New Zealand, regardless of the particular 
region’s   exposure   to   earthquake   risk.   The implications of the upgrade are significant, 
both for owners and for townscape to which they belong. If the cost puts the viability of 
the building at risk, the owner will be in a position where demolition is the only feasible 
option. This could have far reaching implications for the wellbeing of many small towns 
within New Zealand. 
The Governments decisions follow on from some of the recommendations of the 
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission report on the recent Christchurch 
earthquake. The paper will examine these recommendations and report on the 
submissions to the proposed legislation, particularly as they relate to small-scale 
unreinforced brick masonry buildings. It will examine the social and economic effects of 
the legislation on the provincial town compared to inner city Auckland and suggest that 
there are other cost effective solutions to this dilemma than the route proposed by the 
impending legislation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On September 4th 2010 a 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck the city of Christchurch, New 
Zealand’s   second   most   populated city. It was followed some six months later on the 11th 
February 2011 by another earthquake, this time of magnitude 6.3. This second earthquake 
caused extensive damage across the city and was responsible for the deaths of some 185 
people, mostly as a result of building collapse. The Canterbury Earthquake Royal 
Commission, tasked with examining the reasons for these collapsed buildings, suggested a 
range of recommendations and actions designed to improve the response of the nation to 
another future earthquake. These recommendations have led to the introduction into the New 
Zealand Parliament of the Building (Earthquake-prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013, an 
amendment to the  Building  Act  2004,  with  the  aim  of  “improving methods of managing New 
Zealand’s  stock of earthquake-prone buildings”.  
This paper will examine the recommendations put forward by the Canterbury Earthquakes 
Royal Commission (The Commission), outline the nature of the bill and its intent, and 
examine the submissions by the community and building industry made to the parliamentary 
select committee following its introduction to the Parliament on the 9th December 2013. The 
proposed amendments have created controversy within the building industry. The paper will 
examine the social and economic effects of the legislation on the provincial town 
compared to inner city Auckland and suggest that there are other more cost effective 
solutions to this dilemma than the route proposed by the impending legislation. 
1.1. The home shop: small town heritage 
The Commission’s  proposals,  if  carried  through  into  legislation,  will  have a significant impact 
on the heritage value of many small towns throughout New Zealand, especially in older 
communities where many buildings within the local shopping precinct are constructed in 
unreinforced  brick  masonry  (URM),  and  as  such  regarded  as  “earthquake-prone”.  Many  of  the  
small provincial towns serviced surrounding farming districts at a time when transport 
difficulties made travel any distance a difficult exercise. They served as the social and 
economic hub for the district. A common type of construction pre 1940 was the “home shop”, 
typically with a modest retail area on the ground floor, and accommodation for the shop 
owner and their family on the upper level, accessed via an internal stair. External construction 
was single or cavity brick construction, often with protruding parapets elaborately adorned. 
Examples remain plentiful in centres such as Taumaranui, Paeroa, Thames, Gisborne, Napier, 
in the North Island, and Oamaru, Balcultha, Invercargill, Hokitika, to name but a few, in the 
South Island.   
The home shop also formed the backbone of the many urban suburban settlements that grew 
up around the larger cities. In Auckland for example, such centres as Ponsonby, Grey Lynn, 
Herne Bay, Dominion Rd, Mt Eden, Otahuhu and Papakura, have many URM home shop 
buildings still gracing the main streets. Data from the GIS Science Consultancy Report 
suggests some 20% of buildings constructed pre-1940 were constructed in Un-reinforced 
Brick Masonry. Figure 1 refers [1, 4]. 
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Figure 1. Source: Author 
2. THE CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKES ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 
The Commission was of the view that existing buildings in New Zealand, particularly 
those older buildings constructed of unreinforced brick masonry (URM) and part of the 
communities mentioned above, are poorly managed in terms of their capacity to protect 
the inhabitants from the effects of earthquake. The recommendations were many and 
varied. The main recommendations, as they relate to URM buildings included 
amendments to The Building Act 2004 to ensure: 
x Structural engineers in New Zealand are thoroughly familiar with the procedures 
needed to evaluate existing buildings and for the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment (MBIE), the government ministry responsible for building and 
construction, to take responsible oversight of this. 
x A grading system for existing buildings is developed that  is  “able  to  be  understood  
by the general public and adequately describes the seismic performance of a 
building.”   
x  Hazardous elements within URM buildings are strengthened, or in the case of falling 
hazards, such as chimneys, parapets and ornaments, are removed.  
x The   creation   of   legislation   to   empower   territorial   authorities   to   ensure   “timely  
improvements”   in   the   strengthening   of   existing earthquake-prone URM buildings 
within  their  area  of  jurisdiction,  and  “that the maximum time permitted to complete the 
evaluation and strengthening of existing buildings should be set nationally” [Italics by 
Author] 
Other recommendations of a more detailed nature gave advice on the degree of strengthening 
required.   In   general   terms,   to   protect   life   safety,   the   Commission   suggested   the   “shaking  
level”  for  these  existing  buildings  be  set  at  no  less  than  “one  third of the requirements for a 
new building. Where however elements of URM posed a particular threat to health and safety, 
that is, elements such as parapets, ornaments and external walls, that a higher level of 
protection would be warranted.  
The Commission also   suggested   that   territorial   authorities   have   discretion   “to   adopt   and  
enforce a policy that requires a higher standard of strengthening for buildings of high 
importance   or   high   occupancy”.   Conversely,   buildings that are very seldom used and so 
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located such as where the risk to life of passers-by is considered minimal could be considered 
for exemption from strengthening requirements. Examples of buildings in this category could 
be those associated with farming. 
The Commission acknowledged some URM buildings were of historical importance but was 
of the view that if considered dangerous, and that demolition was the only feasible option to 
making  the  building  safe,  then  the  building’s  status  within  the  Historic  Places  Act  should  not  
prevent this demolition from being carried out [2, 7].  
3. CONSULTATIVE PROCESS AND SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS 
The Government response to The Commission’s recommendations was to hold an internal 
ministerial review. It then combined its own ministry recommendations with those of The 
Commission and published a consultation document Building Seismic Performance: 
Proposals to improve the New Zealand earthquake-prone building system: Consultation 
document (Consultation Document). This document outlined the proposal options to 
improve the system for managing earthquake-prone buildings within New Zealand. It was 
released in December 2012, with submissions required on the proposals from the public 
by 8th March 2013 [3]. The submissions were themselves analysed in a subsequent report:  
Building Seismic Performance: Proposals to improve the New Zealand earthquake-prone 
building system: Summary of Submissions [4]. 
3.1  Criticisms of the existing policy 
Whilst the present act requires Local Authorities to develop policies around earthquake-
prone buildings, there is, according to the MBIE Consultation Document, large discretion 
in  the  present  system  as  to  “how  actively  they  identify  and  deal  with  these  buildings.”  
Individual local authorities have very different approaches to implementing current 
policy requirements. Some local authorities are not actively identifying earthquake-
prone buildings or requiring building owners to deal with them. Other authorities have 
taken some action, but have given building owners very long timeframes to resolve 
problems. A number of authorities have taken strong action, including requiring higher 
strengthening than required by law [3, 16]. 
The MBIE, in its Consultation Document suggested some 15000-25000 buildings would 
fall into the earthquake-prone category but acknowledged this figure was a very broad 
estimate as only a few local authorities  “can  provide  good  data”  [3, 6]. 
Of the 66 local authorities, only 23 were able to provide any information on the 
number of earthquake- prone buildings in their districts, and much of the information 
received was incomplete [3, 12]. 
Under the current system, many earthquake-prone buildings are not being identified or 
dealt with in a timely and cost-effective way. The issues include too much variance in 
local authority practice, public confusion about risk, a lack of good data on buildings, 
and lack of central guidance to local authorities [3, 6]. 
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3.1. Submissions received 
As can be expected for a country still getting to grips two year on with the enormity of the 
challenge faced by the earthquake, the call for submissions brought in a substantial 
response, with the MBIE document indicating over 530 responses received. These were 
from a broad cross section of community life, including a significant 42% being from 
individual submitters and members of the public. A cross sectional sample of the main 
categories can be seen in Table 1 [4]. 
 
Stakeholder Percentage 
Individual 42% 
Building Owners 18% 
Local Government 10% 
Architects and Engineers 10% 
Others 20% 
Table 1. Source MBIE: Summary of Submissions 
Most submitters responding to the Consultation Document seem to appreciate the need for 
a  cohesive  strategy  to  improve  New  Zealand’s  earthquake-prone system but were divided 
on how to attain it. There was general support for the proposal requiring each local 
authority to assess the seismic capacity of certain earthquake-prone buildings within its 
jurisdiction. There was also general support from submitters for prioritising assessment 
for certain earthquake-prone buildings and support, though mixed, for the claimed seismic 
capacity information for individual buildings to be entered onto a central register. There 
was mixed support for maintaining the present definition of an earthquake-prone building, 
that   being   a   building   “that   is   likely   to   collapse   in   a   moderate   earthquake,”   with   the  
definition  of  a  “moderate  earthquake”  defined  as  “generating  shaking  at   the  building  site  
that is one-third as strong a what a new building at the same site would be designed to 
withstand,”  or  put  more  succinctly, at 33% of the New Building Standard (NBS) [4, 11]. 
Whilst there was general agreed improvements could be made, there was much in the 
policy to disagree about.  
3.2 Concerns: risk assessment-“one  size  fits  all” 
The legislation requires all URM and other earthquake prone buildings to be ungraded to a 
minimum of 34% of the NBS, regardless of the location of the building. However the 
level of risk from an earthquake varies considerably from other end of New Zealand to the 
other. There are in fact 3 zones, low, medium and high. Wellington (the capital) is in a 
high risk zone (the Wellington fault bisects the southern part of the city). Auckland is 
within a low risk zone. The application of the legislation regardless of location effectively 
means, suggests Tailrisk Economics, the life safety standard for a building in Auckland (a 
low  risk  earthquake  area)  is  about  “three  thousand  times  stronger  than  the  one  applied  in  
Wellington (a high risk area) [5]. What is more, suggests the Tailgate report, compliance 
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with the minimum standard for Auckland will result in a cost in excess of three billion 
dollars, (Tailgate’s  own  report puts it as high as $10 billion) “but  is  expected  to  take  4,000 
years  to  save  a  single  life”  [5, 6]. The report suggest that the definition of what constitutes 
an  “earthquake-prone”  building  should  be  urgently  revisited  and  based  on  evidence  of  risk  
and  not  graded  according  “to   their  estimated  strength   relative   to   the  new  building  code”  
[5, 8]. 
Other submitters responding to the Consultative document also criticised the excessive 
life safety standard applied to earthquake prone buildings.  
Smoking alone kills 20 times as many people each and every year as were killed in 
Christchurch. The total number of Kiwis killed by earthquake is one tenth of those 
killed by smoking and the same for obesity… [4, 12] 
A risk analysis survey commissioned by the Auckland Council, the largest Territorial 
Authority in New Zealand, looked at the statistical probability of a significant earthquake 
and the likely costs, number of collapses, and number of deaths that could result.   
They suggest the risk levels to life from an earthquake were for Auckland statistically 
very low, even for earthquakes with a return period of 500 years or more (0.002 annual 
probability), where as noted, the number of deaths in the Region is estimated as 7, with 2 
deaths estimated within Auckland city itself. Auckland, the location of many URM 
buildings has, suggests the GIS report, rarely experienced even low-level earthquake 
shaking   “since  Europeans   first settled therein the early 1800s and there appear to be no 
historical earthquake casualties”.  The Modified Mercalli intensity (MMI), an indication 
of earthquake intensity, has never been exceeded in excess of MM6, with only 
occasionally localized intensities of MM4 and MM5 shaking, and one instance only of 
MM6 shaking in 1891 (the Waikato Heads earthquake), located some 50 km south of 
Auckland near the mouth of the Waikato river [1, 23]. 
There is, the report notes, potential loss of life from two local fault sources, the Wairoa 
North fault, the only one within the Auckland Region boundary, and the Kerepehi fault 
(off shore segment) that lay further away, bisecting the Hauraki Plains and north into the 
Firth of Thames. In the case of the former, building collapse on or near the fault would be 
considerable. However as the fault lays “mostly   in   farmland  and   forested   country  where  
there   are  very   few  buildings”   little   loss  of   life can be expected [1, 13]. This is in direct 
contrast to Wellington region, where the Wellington fault bisects in turn Wellington city, 
Lower Hutt and Petone, all commercial and/or residential areas, with Porirua, another 
residential district traversed by the separate Ohariu fault. In the case of the Kerepehi fault 
in the Firth of Thames however, damage at the fault line to buildings is non-existent, as 
the fault line is under water. 
In both cases, the modelling indicates a level of intensity in the region and across 
Auckland city of between MM7 and MM8, with repair costs between $1-2 billion for 
buildings and 20-50 deaths. However says the report, the danger is offset by the long 
return periods for both sources, these being 12,600 years for the Wairoa fault, and 20,000 
years for the Kerepehi [1, 24]. 
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The report also models the likely relationship between the MMI level (shaking intensity) 
and   the   likely   probability   of   the   degree   of   damage   to   a   building   (termed   the   “Damage  
stage”).  This  in  turn,  again  via  modelling,  led  to  a  prediction  of  a  “Casualty  state”  for  any  
occupant of a building. Casualty states ranged from CS0: None to CS5: Death.  
For URM buildings in Auckland, the main building type focus of this paper, the likelihood 
of severe injury ( casualty state CS3) from an occupant being in a URM building in a 
severe state of damage DS3 is less than 1% (0.24%). No deaths are predicted. The DS3 
state   is   defined   typically   as   a   condition  where   there   are   “cracks   in   columns   and   beam -
column joints of frames, spalling of concrete cover, buckling of reinforcing rods, large 
cracks in partition and infill walls and failure of  infill  panels”  [1, 13]. Table 2 illustrates. 
 
Casualty State   Building Type: URM     
  DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 
CS1: Uninjured, or light injury 1 1 0.9576 0.8883 0.736 
CS2: Moderate injury 0 0 0.04 0.07 0.12 
CS3: Serious injury 0 0 0.0024 0.035 0.08 
CS4: Critical Injury 0 0 0 0.0007 0.004 
CS5: Dead 0 0 0 0.006 0.06 
Table 2. Source: GIS Science Report 
If this is so, then the criticism expressed by various submitters and within the separate 
report by Tailgate Economics, referred to above, would suggest that the legislation, 
framed as it is on the basis that risk levels are the same throughout New Zealand,  is a 
distinct (though understandable) over reaction to the recent upheavals that occurred in 
Christchurch.  
3.3. Concerns: time frames- “one size fits all” 
The proposed legislation not only treats the whole of NZ as a uniform risk, it also requires  
the upgrading of URM and earthquake-prone buildings within a specified time uniformly 
across the whole of New Zealand. The MBIE document acknowledged this proposal met 
considerable resistance from submitters. Concerns were expressed about the “one-size fits 
all  approach” inherent in the legislation.  
Whilst we agree with the retention of the current standard, the proposed 
timeframes and accountabilities appear too hard-hitting for our communities to 
absorb in any cost effective way [4, 11]. 
Similar arguments were put forward by other industry and Iwi organizations:  
Waikato-Tainui  does  not  support  proposals  that  take  a  “one  size  fits  all”  approach 
and recommend that you take a much broader basis for assessing risk from 
earthquake-prone buildings e.g. identify and categorise areas according to the 
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likelihood of their experiencing an earthquake event i.e. high risk, medium risk, 
low risk [4, 1]. 
Whilst regional variation introduces complexity into legislation, submissions suggested an 
approach that took into account such factors for an area as, seismicity, economic profile 
(high value, high rent versus low value and low rent), local heritage issues and the likely 
impact of the legislation the local community should be taken into account.  
Many submitters suggested a staged approach to strengthening would provide an equitable 
solution to the concerns about safety considerations. The Wairoa District Council 
suggested: 
Further options on retaining decision making at local level, prioritisation of 
building elements (such as parapet) that present greatest risk to life, and longer 
timeframes for full building upgrades is required if the outcomes and work of the 
CERC is to be delivered in a sustainable and enduring manner [4, 16]. 
3.4 Concerns: construction sector capacity 
 Many submitters feel the existing legislation as proposed will result in a logjam of 
applications close to the 15-year termination period. The lack of suitably qualified 
structural engineers, the specialised nature of the work, the lack of familiarity with 
conservation techniques will put at risk a substantial number of small URM buildings, 
which, whilst they may not have significant historic status in themselves, contribute to a 
streetscape heritage that is of significant value and that, once lost, will never be regained . 
The construction sector will also struggle to meet the upsurge in demand as the 15-year 
implementation period draws to a close, as the Heavy Industry Research Association 
suggests:  
Add to this [the Christchurch rebuild] the work associated to strengthen potentially 
25,000 EPBs in the proposed timeframe, then considerable demands will be placed 
on the industry which will then revert back to zero when the demands have been 
met…a more holistic approach strategic approach correlated to the risk may benefit 
not only the wellbeing of our people but also the  New  Zealand  economy” [4, 16]. 
3.5  Concerns: financial and insurance implications 
Submitters responding to the Consultation document voiced concerns that can only be 
briefly summarized in this paper, but are of considerable importance.  Comments included 
concerns about the lack of insurance for such URM buildings impacting on the ability to 
obtain bank finance to upgrade, assuming of course the loan-to-value ratios support a loan 
in the first place. Where they do not, and in many small provincial areas with low value 
and low rent properties that is the case, then financial support is required. The Auckland 
Council’s   submission   recognised   this   dilemma   and   suggested   that   “bank   loans   be  
guaranteed for owners needing to upgrade buildings and for the cost of a seismic retrofit 
(just   that   component)   be   deemed   ‘repairs   and   maintenance’   rather   than   ‘capital  
expenditure’  for  tax  purposes”  [4,  18]. 
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Where territorial authority or other government support is not forthcoming, a Catch-22 
situation arises, with demolition likely as the only viable course of action available.  
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The legislation as presently drafted requires Territorial Authorities to:  
x Complete a seismic assessment of all non-residential, and multi-unit, multi-storey 
residential  buildings  in  their  areas  “within  5  years  of  the  legislation  taking  effect”  
x Enter the results of these assessments into a central register of earthquake-prone 
buildings 
x Ensure the buildings on this register are either strengthened or demolished within 
15 years of this time frame.  
x Require certain strategically placed and/or important buildings to be strengthened 
earlier than the national time frame and 
x Allow exemptions in the form of extended time frames for Category 1 heritage 
buildings [6]. 
It requires all buildings to be assessed, and where considered earthquake prone, to be 
strengthened so they are no longer considered to be so. This threshold is 34% of the NBS.  
The present legislation, if unaltered, will require this work to be done to a single national 
time frame, without any exception that would take into account the earthquake risk of a 
particular building within a particular location. It follows hence that a URM building in a 
low risk area such as Auckland would be restricted to the same time frame as a URM 
building in Wellington, a known high risk area. The legislation does not appear to address   
the   construction   industry   or   the   engineering   sector’s   capacity   to   complete   the   work   on 
time.  
No financial support has been offered to date, yet there are considerable penalties for non-
compliance. These include a fine of up to $200,000 if the seismic work is not completed 
by the deadline and a fine of up same amount for failing to comply with safety 
requirements imposed by a territorial authority. Such an approach is certain to cause 
wholesale demolition of the home shop in provincial areas, where values are relatively 
low and financial and insurance costs outweigh rental benefit likely from any 
strengthening. In large centres such as Auckland, the costs benefits would be mixed. High 
value areas such as Ponsonby or Devonport with a degree of heritage protection may 
survive. Areas of lessor value, such as Dominion Rd or Papakura would see at the very 
least most of the structures removed for new construction.  
The MBIE Summary of Submissions document indicated a broad level of support for the 
government  making  improvements  to  New  Zealand’s  earthquake  prone  system.  There  was  
a  lack  of  support  for  the  restrictive  time  frame  and  the  “one  size  fits  all”  approach  to  risk, 
especially in low risk areas such as Auckland. Local factors such as wind intensity and 
earthquake risk variation are already a part of the National Building Code and apply 
differently to different parts of the country, dependent on assessed risk. Cladding options 
differ in new residential buildings dependant on a risk matrix that takes into account local 
conditions. Why cannot such variation be used to mitigate the time frames and 
Chris Murphy 
 10 
strengthening requirements of URM buildings?  The Financial Amendment Bill No 3 gave 
limited support to homeowners forced to repair their homes due to their buildings leaking 
through no fault of their own. Why not a similar financial scheme for the owners of 
heritage valued URM buildings forced by legislation to strengthen their buildings to an 
arbitrary value of the NBS, regardless of its location. 
Deaths from persons trapped within URM buildings in Christchurch numbered 4. 
Mortality from persons outside and killed by falling debris numbered 35. Why not limit 
the upgrade as suggested in URM buildings to   “seismically   dangerous   elements   such   as  
unsupported verandas..” [7]. This and the other strategies noted above would result in a 
more socially cost effective solution to this dilemma than the route proposed by the 
impending legislation. 
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